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AN ALTERNATIVE ETHICS FOR RESEARCH: LEVINAS AND THE UNHEARD 
VOICES AND UNSEEN FACES 
 
ACCEPTED FOR PUBLICATION 
 
Abstract 
 
Some social scientists have criticised the workings of research-ethics committees because 
their biomedical model is ill-suited to social-science research in both practical and 
philosophical terms. In this paper we review these criticisms and propose an alternative 
approach to ethical review that is based on the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas.  
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Introduction and aims  
 
Before the 1990s the ethics of research outside in the revised paper section medicine were 
guided largely by the researcherÕs own morality and disciplinary guidance.  Research funders 
and universities often knew little of how researchers proceeded until the results had been 
published.  By the 1990s the legacy of wartime and medical tragedies had combined to create 
guidelines against which all research would be reviewed before it began.  In this paper we 
argue that current procedures for ethical review have drawbacks for researchers in the social 
sciences and provide incomplete protection for those to be researched.  Hence we propose a 
debate on the desirability of an alternative ethical stance for reviewing research, based on the 
work of Emmanuel Levinas.  
 
Research ethics and the social-science critique 
 
The history of research is punctuated by cases where the interests of those to be researched 
were subordinated to those of the researcher, with severe consequences for the former.  In the 
Tuskagee case, some black Americans between 1932 and 1972 were deceived into thinking 
that they were receiving free health care, whereas they were part of a clinical trial studying 
how untreated syphilis developed (Belmont Report, 1978).  In the Milgram case, participants 
were induced apparently to punish others when in fact they were unknowingly the subject of 
an experiment into obedience (Milgram, 1974). Serious issues of peopleÕs rights being 
unprotected had emerged during the Nuremberg trials, especially regarding the Holocaust and 
medical experimentation.  These resulted in the Nuremberg Code of 1947 and the Declaration 
of Helsinki of 1964 (Leaning, 1996).  These focused on protecting people involved in 
medical research by obtaining their informed consent to participation.  Schklenk (2000) 
argues that such protection is still less than total. 
 
One of the most important documents providing guidance on the meaning and practice of 
ethics is the Belmont Report, created under the National Research Act of 1975 (National 
Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioural Research, 
1979, Weinstein 2008). Although not legally binding, Institutional Reviews Boards have used 
the Belmont Report as their main source for advice on ethics in research involving humans 
(Weinstein 2008). Since its inception it has become a model document for other official 
guidelines across different national research boards and institutions. The main objective of 
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the Report was to Ôprovide an analytical framework that will guide the resolution of ethical 
problems arising from research including human subjectsÕ (see Weijer 1999) and its influence 
has been far reaching. Three principles underwrite the Belmont Report: (i) respect for persons 
(autonomy), (ii) beneficence and (iii) justice.  
 
In the Belmont Report respect for persons is conceptualised as: Ôagents should be treated as 
autonomous agents, and [É] persons with diminished autonomy are entitled to protectionÕ 
(Basic Ethical Principles, ¤2). An autonomous individual is defined as capable of deliberation 
about goals (Basic Ethical Principles, ¤3). The first principle comes into force through the 
guidelines provided for the process of informed consent: Ôrespect for persons requires that 
subjects, to the degree that they are capable, are given the opportunity to choose what shall or 
shall not happen to themÕ (Applications, ¤2). Beneficence consists of two components: Ôdo 
not harmÕ and Ômaximise possible benefits and minimise harmÕ (Basic Ethical Principles, ¤7) 
recognising that harm may affect individuals or groups differently based on gender or 
ethnicity (Shore, 2006). In practice, this second principle is realised through the process of a 
risk-benefit assessment taking into account personal and wider societal norms and 
considerations (Shore, 2006). Often, beneficence is interpreted in a utilitarian sense, meaning 
doing the greatest good to the greatest number of people (Shore, 2006). Justice deals with 
Ôwho ought to receive the benefits of research and bear its burdens?Õ (Basic Ethical 
Principles, ¤11). Benefits are often conceived as relating to distributive justice and the 
Belmont Report gives further details how to assess the just distribution of burdens and 
benefits. It distinguishes between justice at the individual level Ð where fairness is used to 
select who should participate in risky research and who can benefit from research Ð and at the 
social level. Here the principle of social justice is introduced to draw a distinction between 
classes of subjects Ôthat ought, and ought not, to participate in any particular kind of research, 
based on the ability of members of that class to bear burdens on already burdened personsÕ 
(Applications, ¤20).       
 
The main moral theory behind these three principles in the Belmont Report is Principlism 
(Weijer, 1999; Shore 2006) A prima facie principle is a normative standard deciding on the 
permissibility, rightness and obligatory nature of actions that fall within a principle but 
leaving scope to compromise, mediate or negotiate if needed (Weijer, 1999). Different 
normative standards can be used such as duty-based or consequentialist ethics, both clearly 
guiding the normative approach in the Belmont Report as discussed further later.    
 
The major complaints against the ethical approach in the Belmont Report can be summarised 
as a complaint against procedural ethics (Guillemin and Gillam, 2004; Rossman and Rallis, 
2010; Banks et al, 2013). Although applauded for protecting research participants, the Report 
has been criticised for being a checklist about the risks and benefits for the participants, 
confidentiality of data, consent and the use of plain language (Guillemin and Gillam, 2004). 
The problem with this procedural approach is that the decisions taken by a research ethics 
committee are separated from what actually happens during the research. It has also been 
suggested that research involving humans creates an intrinsic moral tension. Following the 
Kantian maxim, moral philosophy fails in bio-ethics (and research involving humans) 
because it does not respect the autonomy of individuals: people should never be used as a 
means to someone elseÕs end (Guillemin and Gillam, 2004). An individualÕs decision should 
be led by his/her own interest and not the researcherÕs interest. The solution is to let the 
participants co-own the projectÕs goals and not just be ÔsubjectsÕ. One or even the way of 
achieving this is through prior informed consent. In other words, the Kantian maxim of 
respecting the autonomy of individuals can explain the ÔtyrannyÕ of informed consent and the 
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obsession with the use of plain language in ethics review boards. Procedural ethics are thus 
the ruling force in Institutional Review Boards because they are perceived to be the best 
option for circumventing the intrinsic moral tension between respecting autonomy and 
research involving humans. This reasoning falls under the label of duty-based ethics. Another 
way of justifying rule-based ethics is consequentialist ethics drawing on the promotion of 
utility or well-being, values that are clearly embedded in the second principle of beneficence 
in the Belmont Report.  
 
The legacy of the Belmont Report in the USA was most quickly felt in the biomedical 
sciences. It then permeated into procedures for non-medical research in the UK, notably 
through the Research Ethics Framework from the Economic and Social Research Council 
(ESRC, 2005). There had been precursors in the UK from the Association for Social 
Anthropologists (1999) and the British Sociological Association (2002/4).  The ESRC set out 
ethical principles inspired by medicine, a review process with university ethical guidelines 
conforming to ESRC principles, and a checklist of requirements to be approved by a 
university Research Ethics Committee.  The focus was on informed consent, freedom from 
coercion and the avoidance of harm to participants.  While some medical-style safeguards 
may be Ôdifficult or impossible to quantify or anticipate in full prior to the start of a social 
science research projectÕ and although Ôinformed consent maybe impracticable or 
meaningless in some researchÕ, nonetheless Ôthe researcher should seek informed consent 
where possibleÕ (ESRC, 2005, p21).  However, An EU Code of Ethics for Socio-Economic 
Research took a more nuanced view with even key principles such as informed consent being 
couched in terms of multiple debates, dilemmas and context (Dench, Iphofen and Huws, 
2004, pp63Ð71).   
 
However, the near-universal adoption by universities of ethics committees that apply to all 
research those national ethical principles devised for medical research, has generated debate 
and criticism.  The American Anthropological Association (1998) stressed contingencies 
rather than universal principles in its ethical review of research. ÔIt is understood that the 
degree and breadth of informed consent required will depend on the nature of the project and 
may be affected by requirements of other codes, laws, and ethics of the country or 
community in which the research is pursued.  Further, it is understood that the informed 
consent process is dynamic and continuous; the process should be initiated in the project 
design and continue through implementation by way of dialogue and negotiation with those 
studiedÕ.  
 
Schrag (2011), Hammersley (2009, 2015), Stanley and Wise (2010), Colnerud (2015) and 
Dingwall (2008) have summarised other issues.  University research ethics committees may 
lack the disciplinary skills of the peer-review process and so may fail to appreciate the 
particuliarities of some disciplines and proposals. They may mandate general ethical 
principles that are unfeasible (Schrag, 2011; Monaghan, OÕDwyer and Gabe, 2013). Schrag 
(2011) argues that when committees spend their limited time resources on low-risk, social-
science research they are giving too little attention to, and so are harming, those in higher-risk 
science research.  Dingwall (2008) goes further.  The harm from social-science research is so 
limited that it is outweighed by the harm caused by researchers allegedly Ôplaying the ethics 
review gameÕ Ð telling the committee what they want to hear, acting other than as approved 
or not doing necessary research, which would be a loss to society and academic freedom 
(Israel, 2014).  Haggerty (2004) and Stanley and Wise (2010) highlight Ôethics creepÕ, both in 
the prescriptions in the ESRCÕs ethics framework as it expanded from the 2005 version to the 
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one in 2010, and in the operations of ethics committees.  The definition of the ÔharmÕ to be 
avoided is widening and the intensity of scrutiny increasing.  
 
Further criticisms focus on the distinctiveness of the social sciences Ð often field sciences less 
able to foresee or plan events than in a laboratory.  Ethnographers and anthropologists in 
particular have argued that their observational and narrative methods make the biomedical 
model particularly limiting (Atkinson, 2009; Smythe and Murray, 2000; Librett and Perrone, 
2010).  The latter argue that anonymity may be impossible, while Atkinson argues that ethical 
review is based on ethical protocols that Ôdo not match the social realities that the researchers 
themselves want to exploreÕ hence Ôcontemporary regulation of social science research is 
sociologically and anthropologically illiterateÕ (p28).  Wiles and Boddy (2013) query whether 
biomedically based ethical review can deal appropriately with research based on children, 
longitudinal studies, e-research and the secondary analysis of data.  Crabtree (2013) makes a 
similar point regarding research on the experiences of vulnerable groups.  Arguing that ÔtrustÕ 
is critical for researching vulnerable people long term, Pirrie et al. (2012) note that trust is a 
concept that sits uneasily in the protocols of current ethical review. Colnerud (2015) and 
Hammersley and Traianou (2011) both also make the point that current ethical review is 
excessive in some areas and inadequate in others that are outside the law, even if the latter are 
ethically important and problematic.  Pollock (2012) makes a similar point on the potentially 
stifling effect of current ethical practices on the study of the vulnerable in the field, where 
microethics judgements are needed but disallowed.   
 
Overall, it is argued that risk-averse institutions are demanding ethical standards, inspired by 
a biomedical model of universally applied principles, within a narrow definition of ethics that 
is inappropriate for much of the social sciences.  Managerialism in universities and research 
funders requires risk management, documentation, the precise implementation of plans, and 
standardisation to achieve equity of treatment and auditability (McAreavey and Muir, 2011).   
 
The responses to the critique 
 
This critique has provoked responses that range from rejection to incorporating the criticsÕ 
points in an improved ethical-review system.  The strongest defence of prospective (i.e. pre-
research) ethical review is from London (2012). He does not accord any research an opt-out.  
He shows why the benefits of prospective ethical review are real but hard to measure.  The 
preparation for review weeds out poor proposals before submission.  Inexperienced 
researchers are helped to learn the rules. He and Klitzman and Appelbaum (2012) 
acknowledge the dangers of committees nit-picking good proposals to show they are doing 
something.  HedgecoeÕs (2008) ethnographic study of research ethics committees failed to 
show any bias against, or misconstruction of social-science research.  Jennings (2012) 
disputes that social-science research is always intrinsically low risk in terms of harm to 
participants.  He contrasts the attempts at standardising NHS ethical-review processes with 
the lack of quality control over the university equivalents.  Bond (2012), like Jennings 
(2012), accepts the force of SchragÕs (2011) points and proposes reforms to avoid committees 
being hijacked by excessive concerns for remote contingencies in social-science research, 
while maintaining public trust (a point London (2012) also makes).  His recommendation for 
improving ethical review for the social sciences is to focus less on harm reduction (often with 
an ever-widening definition of unlikely forms of harm) and instead to focus on rigour, respect 
and trust. Chenhall, Senior and Belton (2011) provide the anthropologist in the field with 
some practical ways of dealing with issues of consent, standardised guidelines and 
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unexpected ethical dilemmas, while remaining within the principles used by research ethics 
committees. They stress the need for reflexivity, microethics and respect for local conditions.   
 
Insights from research in various contexts and cultures 
 
Many researchers working in different contexts and cultures have reported additional 
concerns about the practicality and appropriateness of the ethics codes debated so far in this 
paper. The first problem is that researchers are unclear how to react when unforeseen ethical 
issues arise in the field (as they often do) when the structure of ethical review is based on 
prospective review and approval.  A further review of revised plans may be impracticable.  
Simply reporting!afterwards changes of ethical importance is easy for the researcher but may 
devalue the ethical-review process.   
 
The second set of issues is practical.  How do you obtain informed consent if the local 
language does not contain words that are the equivalent in meaning to those one would 
normally use in, say, English, e.g. ÔplaceboÕ (Krosin et al., 2006)?  How do you record 
informed consent in a pre-literate society?  Many sheets with crosses prove nothing though 
they meet the procedural requirement.  How do you persuade people to sign a consent form 
when they fear signing anything in case of negative repercussions?  If ÔresearchÕ in general is 
viewed with suspicion, and if some people are less willing to answer truthfully questions on 
sensitive topics (Bleek, 1987), then the cultural underpinnings of ÔconsentÕ for ÔresearchÕ are 
very different.  From whom should consent be obtained in societies where absolute individual 
autonomy is not the norm Ð from the community leader, the husband, the individual or from 
all of them, each having a veto (Agulanna, 2010; Adu-Gyamfi, 2014)?  And can the 
individual realistically be autonomous and refuse when their elders agree? 
 
These concerns lead on to a much wider debate over cultural imperialism (or objectivism) 
and cultural relativism.  Should ÔWesternÕ ethical standards and procedures be imposed on 
everyone everywhere because they are the best Ð even if Ôgold standardÕ only by Western 
norms Ð and because they sit comfortably with Western researchers, funders and institutions? 
Or should ethical practice be tailored to local norms?  This can become a rather sterile 
dualistic debate lacking an agreed resolution.  CorradettiÕs proposal (2009) for a Ôuniversal 
pluralismÕ may be a way forward Ð the essences of both full universalism and relativism 
being combined Ð or it may satisfy no-one. 
 
The final concern raised by some researchers is the disquiet expressed by potential 
respondents over whether the research will benefit them (Benatar, 2002).  Will their health or 
standard of living be improved, or will the information gathered from them Ð their responses 
or samples Ð be taken for analysis elsewhere by researchers they will never see again, leaving 
them no better off?  Who, in short, is the research for Ð the researcher, those researched or 
both?   Do we need a new ethics for research (Benatar and Singer, 2010; Chenall, Senior and 
Belton, 2011)? 
 
An alternative research-ethics framework: the ethics of Levinas 
 
ÔResearchÕ is generally seen as the Ôproduction of knowledgeÕ, which is conducted within an 
ethical framework based largely on a biomedical model that prioritises non-maleficence 
(doing no harm, primum non nocere) and leans strongly towards the universal application of 
Western ethical principles irrespective of the cultural or disciplinary setting in which they 
will be applied.  The unpredictable and diverse processes of fieldwork may require a 
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renegotiation and reconsideration of ethics in the field and hence a revised ethics committee 
approval, yet this is often impractical in the current one-stage, pre-research, review system.  
The current approach is consequentialist Ð ensuring the least harm to the greatest number Ð to 
be achieved deontologically by research ethics committees carrying out their prescribed legal 
and administrative duties and procedures.  The protection!from harm and financial or 
reputational penalty is, first, for the defence of the researcher, their institution and the 
research funder and only then for the individuals and communities being researched. Their 
protection is assumed to follow unproblematically from the initial ethical review.   
 
Since the Belmont Report, social-science research has become far more reflexive and critical. 
Institutional review boards have been deemed out of tune with this demand for a non-violent 
transformative ethical consciousness (Lincoln and Cannella, 2009). While acknowledged for 
regulating procedural ethics, they have been criticised for an inflexible approach which sits 
uncomfortably in an era when research has come to be about understanding complexities and 
power structures. Institutional review boards have become places where regulations are 
enacted by elites far removed from the practices of research and hence ill placed to address 
the unheard voices of research participants (Cannella and Lincoln, 2004). The Belmont 
Report is too focused on regulating a vertical and hierarchical relationship between the 
researcher and what it refers to as Ôresearch subjectsÕ (Shore, 2006; Lincoln and Cannella, 
2009). Ethics in institutional review boards has been criticised as being a symptom of the 
neoliberalisation of research (Cannella and Lincoln, 2007). The dominance of a Kantian 
approach has led to an ethical approach that intensifies an individualistic ethical framework. 
Ethics may need to adopt a relational approach between researcher and researched, both 
learning how to treat others equitably through dialogue and negotiation (Guillemin and 
Gillam, 2004; Cannella and Lincoln, 2007; Emmerich, 2013) 
 
There is a radical alternative approach to research and research ethics that puts virtue ethics 
and the wellbeing of those to be researched Ð their unheard voices and unseen faces Ð at the 
heart of research.  This is based on the work of the philosopher and Jewish theologian, 
Emmanuel Levinas (1906Ð1995).  In his two major works Ð Totality and Infinity (1961) and 
Otherwise than Being (1974) Ð he outlines a theory of ethics that moves away from 
individuality and ego and suggests an ethics of alterity Ð an ethics for others. Unlike 
utilitarian and consequentialist ethical approaches, which emphasise rule-based methods, a 
Levinasian research-ethics strategy rejects an ethics of moral rules (Manderson, 2006).  For 
Levinas, ethics is a responsibility to other people that is involuntary and singular. ÔThe 
demand of ethics comes from the intimacy of an experienced encounter, and its contours 
cannot therefore be codified or predicted in advanceÕ (Bauman, 1993 in Manderson, 2006 
p.8).  In contrast to a Kantian moral framing based on rules, Levinas argues that ethics is 
about interpersonal relationships, not abstract principles; for him, an ethics based on universal 
first principles is a contradiction in terms.   
 
For Levinas morality must be sought in what is Good but the problem is that the judgement 
of what is Good necessarily involves others who are distant from the individual and outside 
the scope of ontology. An inherent egocentrism towards individuals is at the heart of 
traditional ontology; for Levinas, to be means to be stuck in oneÕs own being.  Levinas reacts 
strongly against this singular and totalitarian approach and looks for the Good beyond oneÕs 
being and finds it in the Ôface of the OtherÕ.  The Other has its own dignity and therefore can 
demand to be respected; the face of the Other breaks down singularity and humanises the 
Self.  The appeal of the Other to be ÔlovedÕ is so powerful that the Self becomes detached 
from its own being.  A Levinasian research ethics would shift the focus from researchers as 
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the guardians of a superimposed code of personal ethics to people who are obliged towards 
the Other (Hay, 1998).   
 
Both Levinasian and Kantian approaches to research ethics highlight the importance of 
showing respect for others. While the Belmont Report calls for ÔRespect for PersonsÕ, 
Levinas requires ÔRespect the OtherÕ. Autonomy is one of the most important principles in 
the Belmont Report. Autonomy and the idea of self-determination are central characteristics 
of the good life and in the Belmont Report we find a Kantian approach towards autonomy 
through, for example, the notion of a free decision to participate in research: the researcher 
does not coerce participants. LevinasÕs philosophy, on the other hand, is driven by the idea 
that heteronomy replaces autonomy, arguing that the subject (the researcher) must be 
subjected to the Other (the participant).  
 
Levinas criticised Western philosophy for being focused on autonomy and ÔtotalisingÕ (i.e. 
rejecting difference), for avoiding the complexity of reality and so being incapable of 
addressing our relations with others.  Levinas contrasts this Ôautonomous philosophyÕ and its 
continual return to the ego of the Self, with his Ôheteronomic philosophyÕ that is based on the 
Other. The trope that Levinas employs to describe the encounter with the Other is the ÔfaceÕ.  
In the chapter Ethics and the Face in Totality and Infinity Levinas (1961) uses the example of 
how the hunger seen in the face of the Other calls out to the Self.  It is the proximity of the 
face that arrests the Self, even inducing paralysis (Bernasconi, 1995; Hofmeyr, 2007).  ÒIn a 
world of hunger, I am an oppressorÓ (Levinas 1961 p.200). The vulnerability experienced in 
the face of the Other commands a response from the Self. It is the face of the Other that 
allows a self-discovery through the ÔpainÕ of the Other (Manderson, 2006).   
 
Levinas explains the infinite responsibility of the Self for the Other through the concept of 
proximity which is understood by Levinas as implying simultaneously closeness and distance. 
The Other can be approached but is never reached.  This ambiguity leads to infinite 
responsibility. Therefore our difference and distance from others indicate that it is impossible 
to cement our responsibility towards the Other in rules, logic or knowledge about the Other.  
Proximity, for Levinas, is about emotions, the body and the experience in the moment and 
that experience is not an abstract idea. In Levinasian ethics, a research relationship can be 
ethical only if its characteristics are not predetermined.  If institutionalised ethical practices 
are centred round a standard contract setting out the parameters of an ethical relationship 
prior to an encounter with the Other, then they are the opposite of an ethical relationship.  
 
For Levinas, the free will or autonomy of the participant is not guaranteed through the 
principle of prior informed consent; rather the opposite is true. By consenting to the research, 
the autonomy of the participant is violated because actions are driven by the researcher. 
Levinas criticises Greek philosophy because it protects the free will of the Self by 
neutralising the will of the Other who is ÔcapturedÕ by the self. The justification for informed 
consent is that it protects free will and autonomy, and protects against deception and coercion 
(Kristinsson, 2009). Yet questions can still be raised about whether it can overcome the 
power relations embedded in research practices, despite the best of intentions. Levinas 
proposes the opposite Ð a research ethics ruled by the Other that can address the power 
relations and the other complaints against universal procedural ethics. Contrary to the 
Belmont Report, the starting point of a Levinasian ethics is a position of responsibility for the 
Other rather than starting from the position of autonomy. A Levinasian ethics can respond 
better than the Kantian approach to the call for social-science researchers to be more radical, 
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egalitarian and anti-colonial because LevinasÕs starting point as first philosophy is 
heteronomy and not autonomy.   
 
Anthropologists and ethnographers have found a Levinasian research ethics more appealing 
because it provides a framing that allows them to respond in the field to the demands of their 
research participants (Metro, 2014).  Pre-formulated consent practices lose meaning once the 
ethnographer is confronted with unique situations set in local practices, vocabularies and 
customs.  Ethnographers question whether everyone shares the capacity for autonomous 
decision-making (Benson and OÕNeil, 2007; Metro, 2014). They contest the validity of a 
Cartesian model of subjectivity based on the principle that all individuals are autonomous and 
make rational decisions about how to interact, guided by a common belief in the universal 
principles of democracy and freedom.  The consent form, they argue, should not be a 
straightjacket but should be the part of the research process that sets out the conditions for a 
relationship that should evolve once the research has started.  
 
The requirement of flexibility is another reason why a dialogue with Levinas matters. This 
relates to the distinction between procedural and practical ethics. From a procedural 
perspective the current practice in institutional review boards may be adequate to deal with 
informed consent, confidentiality, rights to privacy, deception and protecting human subject 
from harm (Guillemin and Gillam, 2004). However, all researchers recognise that they will 
encounter tricky moments in the field. In the literature this is identified as situational ethics, 
referring to moments that are unexpected (Fletcher, 1966; Ellis, 2007). It is their 
unpredictability that makes them ethically important because, being unanticipated, they have 
not been discussed in institutional review boards. Nevertheless, these ethical moments still 
need a modus operandi. Ethics in practice, situational ethics or micro-ethics all refer to the 
unexpected moments in the field that demand an ethical reflection and action.  
 
General rules and principles agreed in institutional review boards may not be helpful because 
the tricky moments usually occur as part of daily life during fieldwork (Banks et al 2013). 
This requires an Ôethical sensitivity to see the ethical salient features of situations and 
relational virtues such as trustworthinessÕ (Banks et al, 2013: p. 266). Virtue ethics and an 
ethics of care are often the primary moral drivers for such an engagement and such 
relationships come with responsibilities (Ellis, 2007; Rossman and Rallis, 2010; Banks et al, 
2013). An ethics of care is based on the principles of mutual respect, dignity and 
connectedness. However, it is often part of a longer-term relationship and not all ethical 
moments present themselves between the researcher and the so-called research subjects. 
Often the trickiest moments occur during random encounters with those outside the approved 
research plan. An ethics of care is relational and therefore an improvement on individual-
based ethics. But the starting point is still driven by the researcher: s/he decides how to relate 
to the participants (Rossman and Rallis, 2010). An ethics of care requires the researcher to act 
with Ôhearts and mindsÕ (Slattery and Rap, 2003 in Banks et al, 2013). The danger is that the 
ethical moments in the field are seen as just dilemmas and the researcher follows her/his 
instinct. But for a reasoned moral decision, guidelines are needed on how to negotiate 
relationships as a precondition for ethical behaviour (Guillemin and Heggen, 2009). Ethical 
mindfulness is not a choice that should be left to the researcher on the spot. In a Levinasian 
approach it is no longer the researcher taking the decision on how to care for the Other: it is 
the Other demanding that the researcher fulfil their responsibility to look after the Other.  
 
This alternative approach should nourish the relationship between researcher and participants 
based on an intersubjectivity that allows the researcherÕs Self to explore multiple forms of 
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being through a discursive engagement with the Other (the research participant).  Instead of 
giving a fixed meaning to an ethical relationship through a previously arranged consent form, 
an ethical relationship should emerge through dialogue during the research.  What counts as 
ethical behaviour must not result from a monologue, because meaning does not reside only in 
the speaker.  Language is interactive and meaning is formed through the interaction between 
the speaker and listener.  Research ethics, for Levinas, should not be based on an assumption 
of shared meanings and understandings captured in a universal language of prior informed 
consent, but rather research ethics should Ôbecome vehicles of constant semiotic negotiationsÕ 
(Metro, 2014 p.178; Hill et al, 2010). As Judith Butler (2005) argues, a Levinasian ethics 
prevents totalising knowledge of the Other, that is, a systematic reduction of the Other 
(lÕautre) to the same (le mme). Extending this line of thinking, contract-based consent forms 
assume that all parties share the same meanings, language, priorities and understanding of 
research. However, as Sakai (1997) argues, a dialogical process is ÔheterolingualÕ, meaning 
that even with a common language researchers should act as though they are addressing a 
ÔforeignerÕ because it would be unethical to predict the ethics or understandings of the 
research participants.  
 
This makes for us a Levinasian ethics distinct from an ethics of care based on trust, friendship 
and long-term relationships. Even researchers who whole-heartedly embrace the principles of 
ethics of care, still question how far their responsibility towards the other should reach 
(Ritterbusch 2012). The reflections about positionality, caring after the fieldwork, reciprocity 
and considerations of participatory research are inadequate in a Levinasian ethics. For 
Levinas, we tend to totalise (simplify) the Other in one of two ways. Either we totalise them 
by keeping their strangeness at a distance and using a discourse that emphasises the 
differences and separation from us and defines the Other solely by their difference from us Ð 
a form of relativism.  Or we totalise the Other through discourses that accentuate sameness 
and union Ð a form of universalism (Manderson, 2006).  We condemn the Other either to 
remain outside our comprehension because of their strangeness or we reduce the strangeness 
to sameness so that the Other becomes comprehensible.  For Levinas, the former mistake is 
part of a tradition of deontological liberalism or a philosophy of rights in which the integrity 
and uniqueness of the Other is preserved and kept at a distance because its distinctiveness.  
The latter mistake is part of a tradition of teleological liberalism or utilitarianism as it 
preserves the equality of others to the Self because we share values and norms across society 
as a whole.  Both use the Self as the starting point to build knowledge and this severely limits 
our opportunity to understand the Other because we either reduce everything to the same as 
us or to something wholly different.  Totalising others in either way is unethical for Levinas. 
 
This totalising process prevents us developing valid ethical relations with others.  For 
Levinas, proximity is not physical closeness; it is a trope introduced by Levinas to convey 
responsibility. The proximity of the Other destabilises and decentres the ego. The presence of 
the Other excites us; it creates an obligation.  The proximity of the Other makes us more 
aware of ourselves.  However, from a Levinasian perspective, proximity is not only a social 
relationship. It is deeply physical; it is a sensation and an experience.  Levinas refers to the 
excitement of the skin, like a blush when we are touched by the Other (Manderson, 2006 
p.102).  Writing from his own experience of the Holocaust, Levinas invokes the memory of 
those who were closest among the six million assassinated by the Nazis (Levinas, 1974 p.v).  
He clearly feels a unique and un-substitutable responsibility towards the victims of the Shoah.  
The proximity towards the Other raises an expectation of responsibility which is 
Òunexceptionable [É] preceding every free consent, every pact, every contractÓ (Levinas, 
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1974 p.114).  How does this responsibility relate to research ethics and how does it go above 
and beyond an ethics of care? 
 
The best way to describe this is the paralysis encountered during fieldwork by Vermeylen in 
Namibia, Botswana, Uganda, Ghana and Zambia over more than a decade. Most papers refer 
to ethical moments in the field directly related to their interactions, friendships and changing 
relationships during the fieldwork with their research participants. The encounters recalled 
here are those with ÔstrangersÕ, people whom you meet in everyday life: at the bus stop, in the 
marketplace, or just passing by in the streets. Most of these fleeting moments were positive 
encounters but there have also been instances were patience was lost, distrust crept in and 
frustration was experienced. Sometimes someone hides the truth, spins a good story to make 
you feel guilty or provokes you to do unanticipated things. How can a Levinasian ethics help 
with these tricky moments? It may seem easier to get out of the situation if it is a stranger, but 
there are moments when close research collaborators and participants have behaved 
deceitfully or unethically. Will feelings of trust, friendship and ethics of care still give 
guidance now? These tricky moments paralyse researchers and only the face of the Other, the 
stranger will tell the researcher what they can and must do.  
 
According to Levinas, the vulnerability experienced in the face of the Other commands a 
response from the Self, but not to impose, possess or assimilate the Other.  It is the OtherÕs 
face that allows a self-discovery through their ÔpainÕ (Manderson, 2006).  Although in 
Totality and Infinity (1961) hospitality is the welcome given to the Other who calls upon the 
Self to respond, it is still a host-guest relationship.  In Totality and Infinity (1961) Levinas 
stresses the strangeness of the stranger that results in the Self being questioned and 
questioning him/herself in the face of the stranger.  In Otherwise than Being (1974) this 
relationship becomes more risky as the host (the Self) may become hostage: not all 
encounters with the Other are benign. For Levinas this danger is a necessity as Ôit is in the 
condition of being hostage that there can be in the world pity, compassion, pardon and 
proximityÕ (Levinas 1974, p.117).  This shift is achieved through changing the positioning of 
the Other who is now close to the Self Ð a neighbour now whom one should not avoid.  
Because of the SelfÕs infinite responsibility towards the Other, the Self hosts the demands of 
the Other but equally is held hostage by these demands.  The feeling of being a hostage to the 
vulnerability of the Other is at the core of consciousness, as it is for a child or parent.  The 
infinite demands of the Other cannot be anticipated, may surprise us, may not be welcome 
but they are inevitable and therefore unpredictably difficult (Manderson, 2006).    
 
A stronger challenge is being called upon to act when the norms encountered in the face of 
the Other are perceived as unethical.  However, for Levinas the face indicates a relation of 
responsibility but he does not use it to give us specific moral obligations (Minister, 2012).  
The face does not reveal actual moral obligations or actions, but the Ôpractical demands [from 
the face] are derived from an interpretation of the possibilities for destitution within human 
existenceÕ (Minister 2012, p.207).  For Levinas, an ethical relationship is characterised by a 
close relationship between justice and forgiveness. Justice Ôis called into being by this very 
mercy with a concern to recognise all the othersÉÕ (Levinas, 2001, p.230 in Slaughter, 2007, 
p. 50). The Self still has to use their judgement dictated by the vulnerability of the Other to 
choose the right response that meets LevinasÕs conception of an ethical relationship in the 
particular circumstances. 
 
A Levinasian ethics asks us to think about ethics well beyond a rule-based duty in a specific 
research project. Particularly within the context of research projects in the global South, the 
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purpose of research may be questioned. Is it only about generating knowledge and advancing 
science and careers or are wider issues at stake? Can and should research be about the needs 
of others and part of a restorative process after the injustices of totalising discourses (Young, 
1990)? These are questions not usually considered in current ethics committees but they are 
precisely pointing out the responsibility Levinas is arguing for.  
 
Applying a Levinasian ethics to social-science research implies a scepticism towards standard 
ethics forms, prior informed consent and other codified institutionalised rules based on pre-
research (prospective) planning.  Ethics is part of a general motivation to feel responsible for 
injustice.  Ethics raises issues about the wider role of universities in society and the research 
they are facilitating.  So far, this sense of responsibility can remain tucked away either in the 
unreported details of fieldwork or buried in our consciousness. Tricky moments of frustration 
or apathy can be airbrushed in fieldnotes, but for Levinas these are precisely when we should 
show our humanity and feel responsible for the wider injustices. On a personal note, there are 
moments when we have felt the urge to ask for forgiveness, as white, well educated 
Europeans. However often we asked for consent and recorded it, we remember the moments 
when we should have not shirked our responsibilities. We could have done more. Nobody has 
ever asked us where we have fallen short in the field, where we have avoided a request to 
help, where a blind eye was turned to someone who needed help. We could not have helped 
all who asked, but after engaging more deeply with LevinasÕs work it feels wrong to have 
silenced these moments and concerns.  
 
Discussion 
 
What makes LevinasÕ work distinctive is his idea that ethics should be the first moment in 
philosophy and hence in any research environment and not an afterthought or last-minute 
procedure. For Levinas, ethics is oneÕs responsibility for others.  It is not just situational, but 
is a Òconstitutive form of the human conditionÓ (Benson and OÕNeill, 2007 p.44). This means 
that the researcherÕs responsibility towards research participants is not based on reciprocity: 
the research participant can never be responsible for the researcher. As Levinas said in an 
interview: 
 
The intersubjective relation is a non-symmetrical relation. It is precisely as the 
relationship between the Other and me is not reciprocal that I am subjected to no 
Other; and I am ÒsubjectÓ essentially in this sense. It is I who support all. (Levinas, 
1985, p.95 in Benson and OÕNeill, 2007, p.44).  
 
For Barnett (2005), this quotation signifies that responsibility is infinite. It is also non-
reciprocal because my responsibility does not rely on me expecting something back. Despite 
being a challenging ideal, a Levinasian ethic can usefully inform ethical possibilities when 
conducting fieldwork (Benson and OÕNeill, 2007; Richardson-Ngwenya, 2012; Metro, 2014).  
 
In summary, Levinas wants us to overcome totality (the rejection or overlooking of 
difference) (Benson and OÕNeill, 2007). The researcher should be affected by the 
interpersonal relationship and so become self-reflective. S/he ought to challenge (historical) 
power relations when exposed to asymmetry and discomfort. Ethical sensibilities cannot be 
anticipated; they emerge only through encounters in the field. Ethical demands on the 
researcher do not always come from the research design; strangers can make a call on the 
researcher. Ethics is more than just predefining the researcherÕs ethical behaviour in the field; 
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it is an experience of awaiting the call of responsibility that leads the researcher to be affected 
by others (Benson and OÕNeill, 2007).  
 
Being affected in the field by others means that research ethics committees should accept that 
their own ways of knowing and understanding, as well as the researcherÕs, can be challenged. 
Instead of focusing on detailed pre-research descriptions of consent forms and review of 
methodologies, research ethics committees would play a more useful role in the ethical 
process if their attention shifted to a post-research scrutiny of the researcherÕs responses to 
the many faces and voices of the research participants (perhaps messy, disorganised and 
contradictory) as encountered in the field. The unpredictability of the face-to-face encounter 
gets whitewashed away twice during the research process: first, during the institutional 
ethical-review process and, second, in the neat, cool, objective presentation and interpretation 
of the field notes and the interviews.  
 
Changing oneÕs research methodology is desirable, even essential, if circumstances in the 
field require it, such as working in another area if the weather changes or using a new source 
of information.  One might change oneÕs methods after discussions in the field: to overcome 
local objections to the original plan and so allow the research to proceed at all; to improve the 
range or quality of the information collected in ways not foreseen; or to take advantage of 
lines of enquiry or respondents unanticipated before the initial ethical review. So, changing 
oneÕs research methodology may be just pragmatism after meeting the research participants. 
There can be no guarantee they will acquiesce to the researcherÕs approved plans. Klitzman 
and Appelbaum (2012) call for an audit of a sample of completed research projects to learn 
lessons from field practice. This is valuable but, we argue, is inadequate in scope (all projects 
should be reviewed afterwards and shown to be ethical) and inadequate philosophically 
(because changes in the field should go beyond what helps the researcher). Adopting 
LevinasÕs ethical view adds a principle and not just pragmatism. If one adopts a Levinasian 
philosophy of a love for others, one is duty bound to make changes in research methods to 
meet the requirements of those to be researched. The meaning of abstract concepts such as 
consent, harm, autonomy, risk, research or benefit can be negotiated only through face-to-
face encounters in the field. The researcher can respond ethically only when s/he faces in the 
moment the unpredictable words and actions of others.   
 
A change to a pre-approved research plan Ð for whatever reason Ð strictly invalidates the 
initial ethical approval.  If the methodology in practice differs from that approved  the result 
is that, with only a one-stage ethical review procedure, the ethics committee cannot know 
whether the actual research was still ethical.  Neither do the research funder nor the publisher 
of the research results have the necessary ethical assurance, because they rely on the ethics 
committee.  Only a second-stage ethical review Ð after the research Ð can reinstate ethical 
confidence for all parties.  Additionally a post-research ethical check provides an extra 
disincentive to any researcher tempted to depart from the approved plan in ways that might 
go against the ethical principles that underpinned their pre-research ethical review.  The 
ethics committeeÕs ultimate sanction on research changed in the field in ways that are 
unethical is to deny the researcher the authority to publish the material gathered by 
unapproved means. 
 
The hard-pressed researcher might be concerned that an additional, post-research ethical 
review would add greatly to their workload.  It need not.  The only question the researcher 
would have to answer after the research had been completed would be whether the research 
departed materially from that approved.  If the answer is ÔnoÕ, that concludes the post-
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research ethical check.  If the answer is ÔyesÕ, the researcher would be asked to describe the 
changes, justify them, and explain how the key ethical principles that informed the pre-
research review were also upheld in the revised methodology. The assurance of ethical 
probity cannot be secured by only a pre-research review. The process of post-research ethical 
review need not be administratively burdensome.  A post-research meeting between the 
researcher and the institutional ethics committee would be a learning experience for both as 
well as a clear reassurance to funders, publishers and the wider academic community.  Only 
in this way can all parties be reassured that the research was carried out ethically.   
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